Other appointments included CO (Commanding Officer) of No 111 Sqn (Lightnings), Chief Flying Instructor at the Lightning Conversion Unit, CO of No 5 Sqn, Station Commander RAF Wildenrath, Group Captain Operations at HQ 38 Group, Field Force Commander of the RAF Germany Harrier force, Group Captain Operations No 11 (Fighter) Group, Commander Allied Sector One, Brockzetel, Aide de Camp to HM the Queen, Commandant of the Royal Observer Corps and finally Deputy Chief of Operations at HQ Allied Air Force Central Europe from which he retired in 1987 to join Ferranti Defence Systems becoming Director of Military Business Development for GEC-Marconi. He is currently Defence Consultant to Selex Airborne Sensor Systems at Luton.
    George's earliest experiences of Hawker aeroplanes were with the Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire powered Hunter Mks 2 and 5. They were, he said, a delight to fly but were plagued by engine vibration and other problems. During intensive flying trials five engine failures were experienced. He personally made a dead engine approach in manual to a successful landing at Woodbridge but not everyone was so lucky. Coincidentally the squadron had the first UK supersonic ejection when a Flt Lt Headley could not pull out from a dive because he had flaps selected.
    Whilst on his Fleet Air Arm exchange George flew 800 hrs on Sea Hawks and made 300 deck landings during 15 months at sea. A nice thing about the Navy was that you kept your own aircraft. This was, he said, "The most delightful aeroplane I have ever flown", echoing 'Winkle' Brown's sentiments in his talk to the Association. It was a "pilot's aircraft" in which one felt "at home". George thought the Sea Hawk to be ideal for carrier operations and a big step forward from the Supermarine Attacker. When deck landing it was very steady on the approach at 108-110 kn and using the mirror landing aid usually caught the third wire. As a ground attack fighter the Sea Hawk had excellent handling qualities, from its positive manual elevator and easy powered ailerons, which conferred accurate weapon aiming characteristics. Catapult launches, at 3 longitudinal g giving 150 kn in 150 ft, were made with the hood open in case of ditching. George was on HMS Albion during the Suez war flying 25 sorties in 5 days attacking Egyptian Air Force targets. Some Sea Hawks were lost due to debris ingestion during low level attacks with two 500 lb bombs and the four 20 mm cannon. Night attacks were made by following Glow Worm rocket flares fired from Venoms or Avengers.
    His Sea Hawk never let him down although he did bend someone else's aircraft when the nose leg failed to lower and he scraped the nose on the runway. Whilst operating from a carrier in the English Channel his tail hook failed to extend and when he made it to RNAS Ford his engine stopped on the runway, totally out of fuel. Aircraft were often launched in  sea conditions so rough that when the bow was down heavy spray swept along the deck. The launch officer would try to time the catapult so that the bow was up on departure but ship motion is not accurately predictable - they can dwell bow down - and George did on occasion experience close-up views of the waves. There were very few problems with the "very well designed" Sea Hawk but, of course, like all aircraft, more thrust was desirable.
    When he was Chief Flying Instructor at RAF Coltishall one of the 'perks' was being permitted to fly the Battle of Britain Flight (not yet Memorial) aircraft which consisted of Hurricane LF363 and two Spitfires. The Hurricane, said George, was very simple to operate. These aircraft were loaned to the film company making "The Battle of Britain" and were returned in a rather sad state in spite of the fact that they should have been repainted in their original schemes. However, the film company did give the Flight a Mk II Spitfire at the end of filming. While George was at Coltishall the Lancaster was added to the Flight and he flew in the first Hurricane + Spitfire + Lancaster formation.
    Turning to the Harrier he opened by stating that it was a "World-beating concept". It served with the RAF as part of NATO, facing the Warsaw Pact forces in the East, during the Cold War, the aircraft at RAF Wittering covering NATO's flanks, those with RAF Germany dedicated to field operations, initially from RAF Wildenrath. However, from Wildenrath it was 150 miles to the forward bases so the support logistics problem was exacerbated. A forward deployment involved 400 vehicles, 4,000 people and ten train loads of weapons. Consequently the Harriers were moved to RAF Guttersloh where the distance was now only five miles; a very considerable improvement. Here, George was the Field Force Commander with at any one time six sites, each with six Harriers, ready to move every 24 hours to new sites. The weather could be very wet reducing the fields to mud. The STO/VL mode of operation was from 200 m aluminium planking strips and a Royal Engineers' MEXE mat. Concealment by camouflage was vital; the strips were painted green and hides in woodland were employed, effectiveness being checked by recce. aircraft. An early problem was unsatisfactory tow vehicles. With an aircraft stuck in the mud a local farmer was persuaded to bring his Mercedes Unimog along to help; it proved to be ideal so eight were ordered for the Harrier force. In the event of war the peacetime practice sites would not be used; other sites were reconnoitred for this purpose.
    George praised the Harrier's war load and wide array of weapons, but the cockpit was not up to the standard of the rest of the aircraft, and poor-weather flying was difficult; it was "not easy in IMC". Little use was made of the FE541 inertial nav/attack system when operating in the field because there was no time to get a full alignment and because it was not always tolerant of the low altitude highly manoeuvring flight patterns employed. The Wittering aircraft flying greater distances at higher altitudes made more use of it. The FE541 was, it must be remembered, a pioneering analogue system full of little gears and shafts. With its built-in F-95 camera the Harrier was an excellent ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft. Very high sortie rates were achievable; for example, 400 sorties in one day from 36 aircraft with 30 minute turn-rounds (refuel and rearm).
    Aircraft difficulties included bird strikes down those huge intakes, leading to compressor stalls and the loss of aircraft. An early operational difficulty had been communications with the Army field HQ but this potential Achilles heel was solved by moving Army liaison personnel into the sites. In peacetime the RAF was prohibited from using 'war stock' weapons so the Harriers flew with and fired the reusable Matra 155 68 mm rocket pod and not the definitive Matra 116. However, the Field Force Commander insisted that 'war stock' M116s be tried. It was found that the weapons could not be mounted on the Harrier because one bolt was too short; lesson learned.
    George finished with the story of the Harrier UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle, in today's parlance.) Following an engine surge and failure to relight the pilot ejected at 15,000 ft whereupon the engine restarted by itself causing the Harrier to fly on for 25 minutes getting ever closer to the East German border. Unsuccessful attempts were made to shoot it down but fortunately it crashed in friendly territory.
    After this very well illustrated talk George answered many questions from the floor, the answers to some of which have been included above. The vote of thanks was given by Ralph Hooper.