Trevor Davies, Flight Test Engineer and Observer, and Project
Designer
T-45,recalls flight testing at Dunsfold leading to some interesting
aerodynamic developments on the Hawk….
When I left university I went to work for Hawker
Siddeley Aviation
at Dunsfold in Flight test Services. Initially I was involved in
analysing Harrier handling trials data and then a systems trial before,
in 1974, being made responsible for managing the flight trials of the
first Hawk T Mk 1, XX154. During one of the early test-flights, a
preliminary assessment of the low-speed handling in the approach
configuration i.e. undercarriage down and flaps fully down, was being
carried out by Chief Test Pilot Duncan Simpson. On completion of one
test he applied power and, unusually, retracted the undercarriage with
the flaps fully down, to accelerate the aircraft only to find, to his
surprise and consternation, that the nose of the aircraft pitched down
into a dive, a motion that could not be countered even with the control
column pulled fully back. With no obvious reason for the behaviour he
adopted the philosophy of reversing whatever actions he had done last;
he extended the undercarriage. This immediately restored normal pitch
control for a safe return to Dunsfold.
In the post-flight discussion this phenomenon became
referred to as
the ‘Phantom Dive’ – and no, I can’t remember why. In this particular
instance it had occurred at around 20,000ft, which had given Duncan the
opportunity to resolve the situation but if it were to occur in close
proximity to the ground, such as during a landing overshoot, it would
have catastrophic results.
The aerodynamicists Harry Fraser-Mitchell and Barry Pegram were called
in and concluded that the tailplane had stalled because of its
increased negative angle of attack due to the airflow aft of the wing
being deflected downwards – downwash. This is normally present behind a
wing but the effect increases as the flaps are extended. In this case
the amount of downwash due to full flap had caused the tailplane to
stall. But what had suddenly triggered it? Again they had a possible
explanation. Initially the undercarriage had been down which would have
shed a wake onto the flaps and reduced their effectiveness and
consequently the amount of downwash. When the undercarriage was
retracted this wake was removed increasing the downwash sufficiently to
cause the tailplane to stall. The subsequent lowering of the
undercarriage restored the wake, reduced the downwash and un-stalled
the tailplane, allowing pitch control to be regained.
Subsequent flight tests proved this to be the case.
With the undercarriage down there was no tailplane stalling while at
the same conditions it could be provoked simply be retracting the
undercarriage. Extending the undercarriage would then restore pitch
control. We now had an understanding of what had happened and also a
more accurate name for the phenomenon – tailplane stalling – which is
what it was known as from then on. This still left the question of what
to do about it.
The solution turned out to be very simple. The
parallel chord Hawk flaps had a full span vane supported on a number of
brackets protruding from the leading edges of the flaps. Removing a
section of the vane would reduce the effectiveness of the flaps and
hence reduce the associated downwash. The section between the two
outboard brackets, about one sixth of the span, was therefore lopped
off as it was the most heavily loaded aerodynamically. This ‘cut-back
flap vane’ was trialled to see if it was enough to resolve the problem;
it was! The reduced flap effectiveness had a consequent effect on
landing performance, requiring slightly higher approach and landing
speeds, but this was still comfortably within the landing performance
required by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Hawk contract. The ‘cut-back
flap vane’ thus became the standard for all Hawk T Mk 1s and export Mk
50s and 60s.
At the end of the 1970s the US Navy published its
requirement for a new pilot training system, known as the VTXTS, and
BAe, as we had become, teamed with the Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC)
to propose a system based on the Hawk. The Navy requirements meant that
the Hawk would have to be modified for aircraft carrier take-offs and
landings. Strengthening the Hawk for this task meant a significant
increase in weight which, together with a particular carrier landing
approach requirement, known as a ‘glide slope transfer manoeuvre’ was
causing some concern.
By this time the Hawk was being developed as a
ground attack aircraft carrying increasingly heavy external store
loads. The airframe itself was also being further developed to
incorporate a suite of more modern avionics, to become known as the 100
Series, with a consequent increase in aircraft weight. A means was
therefore needed to mitigate the impact of these on approach and
landing speeds. We needed the full span flap vane back!
Were this to be done on the back of the T-45TS
contract, as the VTXTS had by then been named, BAe would have had to
pay royalties to the US Navy for sales to other customers of any
aircraft incorporating the solution. It was decided therefore that BAe
would privately fund the development so that they would retain the
rights to it and could hence use it royalty-free on any future Hawk
variants.
While the aerodynamicists had ideas of potential
solutions they needed a more precise understanding of the magnitude of
the downwash and its impact on the tailplane. Previously, to understand
airflow behaviour on the wing, we had used ‘tufts’, lengths of
parachute cord about 12 – 15 cm. long anchored at one end to the wing
surface with adhesive tape (yes, it did work!) and filmed from cameras
mounted in the rear cockpit looking outboard.
Tufting the side of the rear fuselage and underside
of the tailplane was no problem but how were we going to film them?
There was no place to mount cameras on the aircraft that would give an
adequate view. We had used a chase aircraft from which to film weapons
separation trials on many occasions so the question was asked: could we
do the same to film the tufts? The difference was that weapons trials
took place in a stable flight regime at fairly high speeds whereas
tailplane stalling occurred with the test aircraft not entirely under
the pilot’s control in pitch and with both aircraft flying at a speed
not much above the stall. After a bit of careful thought by Flight
Test, the Test Pilots and Aerodynamics, it was decided that it was
feasible but might take a bit of getting right.
A full-span flap vane was therefore fitted to Hawk T
Mk 1 XX338 and the appropriate areas of the fuselage side and tailplane
were tufted. For the test flight XX338 was flown by Jim Hawkins
accompanied by chase aircraft XX154 flown by Andy Jones with me and a
16mm ciné camera in the rear seat. The objective was to set the two
aircraft up, with undercarriage down and flaps fully down, in formation
where the camera would have a clear view of both the fuselage side and
underside of the tailplane of XX338. For safety’s sake this couldn’t be
too close, given the expected behaviour of XX338, but too distant and
the tuft movements would not be clear in the film. Once ready, Jim
retracted the undercarriage of XX338 and then Andy’s job became one of
holding formation on another aircraft with a stalled tailplane by
flying one that was at not much above stalling speed itself, while
keeping it as stable as possible. This would then give me a chance of
keeping the back end of XX338 not just in the camera frame but steady
enough to be able to see what was happening to the tufts. The quality
of the film we produced was testament to Andy’s flying skills.
The aerodynamicists now had the more precise
understanding that they needed and Barry Pegram devised some ‘tailplane
vanes’. These were small, almost triangular surfaces the long axis of
which ran parallel to the axis of the fuselage, with the apex forward,
and with curved outer edges. They projected normal to the fuselage
surface at a position where the vane trailing edge lined up with the
leading edge of the tailplane when it was in the fully leading edge
down position. In flight it was expected that at higher speeds the
tailplane vanes would have no effect but at low speeds the shed vortex
from the outboard edge would energise the airflow passing under the
tailplane and enable it to remain attached to the under-surface, thus
preventing the tailplane stall. Flight tests subsequently proved this
to be the case and tailplane vanes became a feature not just of the
T-45A Goshawk (as the US Navy’s official designation became) but of all
100 and 200 series Hawks.
Having been successful in securing the US Navy
contract we were, under the terms of that contract, required to provide
verification of all aspects of the aircraft’s design to the US Navy
Project Team, although this did not affect BAe’s rights to the non-T-45
specific design aspects, including the tailplane vanes. This
verification had to be presented at both a Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) and a Critical Design Review (CDR). By the time of the PDR, I had
moved to the Design Department at Kingston as Project Designer T-45 and
as such was involved in both these Reviews.
Prior to the PDR the USN Project Team had been made
aware of the incorporation of the tailplane vanes into the T-45A design
and why. A letter was subsequently received from the US Navy
acknowledging this and stating that, for the US Navy contract, these
were designated Side Mounted, Unit horizontal tail, Root Fins - SMURFs!
Given that in those days the Smurfs were popular childrens’ TV cartoon
characters this designation produced a bit of bemusement within BAe;
until someone noticed the date on the letter – 1st April - Yeah, right!
At the subsequent PDR the US Navy Project team was
given a more comprehensive explanation of the tailplane vanes and
updated on progress to date. At the end of this a very unhappy US Navy
Project Manager had a sense of humour failure and demanded to know why
we were referring to tailplane vanes and not using the official SMURF
designation - Oops!
A copy of the letter was quickly produced and the
date and its implications pointed out. The misunderstanding was simply
explained. You have to remember that in those days (before every desk
had a computer on it) letters were hand-written and then passed to a
typing pool for production of the formal version. This letter had been
written in the final days of March and then passed to the typing pool.
There it had been typed up on 1st April and dated with that date,
something that had not been noticed when it was returned to the writer
for signature and despatch. Fortunately the Project Manager now saw the
funny side of it and, as we promised to correct the designation, the
normal very good relationships were restored.
At the CDR we had the final design information and
results from both high-speed wind tunnel and full envelope flight tests
to present. The format of the overhead-projector slides (this was pre
Powerpoint) for the Reviews was to have a title bar at the top flanked
on one side by the T-45 project logo and on the other by either the BAe
or DAC logo, dependent upon which company had design responsibility for
the particular aspect. For the ‘SMURFs’ presentation we decided to
introduce a little levity by replacing the BAe logo with the face of
one of the well-known little blue men – a grumpy one for the
explanation of the initial issue and a happy cheering one for the
slides presenting the solution. Our DAC colleagues were decidedly
worried about the reaction from the US Navy but as there was not enough
time to produce alternatives we had to run with what we had. As it
turned out the fears were unfounded as the presentation was the trigger
for smiles and a couple of quiet sniggers from the US Navy Project Team.
Editor’s Note: the Phantom Dive name came, I
believe, from McDonnel’s F-4 Phantom which at one time also experienced
tailplane stalling. The SMURFS were devised by Barry Pegram who,
because of his beard, became known as Papa Smurf.