On November 10th Stephen Philpott addressed thirty Members live and
twenty by Zoom on the enduring fallacy that the Supermarine Spitfire
‘won’ The Battle of Britain’ (BoB) and that it was pre-eminent
throughout WW 2. He was introduced by our Chairman, Chris Roberts, who
said that after working for the MoD Stephen joined BAe at Kingston in
1989 as an operational analyst and market researcher. There his belief
that the Hurricane was undervalued relative to the Spitfire by
‘historians’ led him to research the RAF service history of the type
seeking original data: National Records Office material, Squadron
historical records, pilots’ log books and so on. His book, ‘Hawker
Hurricane - Defender of the Skies‘, was the outcome of his studies
comparing the combat records of the Hurricane and Spitfire
Stephen started by stating some basic fact about the Hurricane. It
was easy to build using the simple manufacturing techniques developed
by Hawker for their very successful ‘beautiful biplanes’. The Spitfire
was more complex with a modern stressed skin airframe, less robust than
that of the Hurricane, not able to sustain as much battle damage and
not so easily repairable. The Spitfire also needed a more protracted
test and development programme resulting in fewer aircraft being
available in the Summer of 1940. 1,715 Hurricanes flew with fighter
Command during the BoB, many more than all other fighters combined.
This superiority in numbers led to the outcome of the BoB: actual enemy
losses credited to Hurricanes 661; to Spitfires 518 (56%:44%).
Hawker Hurricane - Dispelling Historical Myths
The Hurricane fought in 33 campaigns in theatres from the ‘phoney’ war
in France to Yugoslavia via the North African desert, the defence of
Malta, southern Europe, the Middle East, east Africa, Russia,
Singapore, Java and Burma, to name but the main ones. In contrast the
Spitfire didn’t leave Britain until 1942. In the Far East Hurricanes
were operational for 3 years 8 months, the Spitfire 1 year 11 months.
Over WW2 looking at air combat only, actual enemy
losses to the Hurricane were 1427, to the Spitfire 1732; whilst
Hurricanes lost were 1631, Spitfires lost were 1822, ‘showing’ superior
results for the Spitfire. But does it? Stephen contended that this was
not a fair comparison because the Hurricane was not used in the air
combat role after 1942 whereas the Spitfire was until the end of the
war. So if you exclude results post 1942 the Hurricane is still
responsible for 1427 actual enemy losses but the Spitfire count reduces
to 1258.
After his talk Stephen answered questions from the
floor before being thanked by Speaker Secretary, Frank Rainsborough.
This talk is available to members on You-Tube. There
were some problems with the sound recording but most is satisfactory.
Copies of Stephen’s book can be obtained from the author at 19 Andrews
Close, Epsom, Surrey. KT17 4EX for £19.99. Phone 07986 764408, e-mail
stphphlptt@aol.com.
Editor’s comments.
We must remember that the Hurricane was, as Stephen
pointed out, essentially of an earlier generation so its success rate
is even more remarkable. The conservative and practical Camm chose to
retain his simple, rugged, tubular steel structure for his first
production monoplane using the existing skills of the Hawker workforce,
whereas Mitchell embraced the new, initially troublesome in
manufacture, stressed skin construction technique concentrating on
achieving high performance. The result, fortunately for the United
Kingdom, was that the RAF had two fine complementary fighters in
sufficient numbers when they were needed. Subsequently the Spitfire was
considerably developed throughout WW2 while Camm‘s Hurricane
successors, the Typhoon and Tempest, were modern stressed skin designs
with, in the case of the Tempest, thinner (elliptical) wings.